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Abstract Observing an action activates action represen-
tations in the motor system. Moreover, the representations
of manipulable objects are closely linked to the motor
systems at a functional and neuroanatomical level. Here,
we investigated whether action observation can facilitate
object recognition using an action priming paradigm. As
prime stimuli we presented short video movies showing
hands performing an action in interaction with an object
(where the object itself was always removed from the
video). The prime movie was followed by a (brieﬂy pre-
sented) target object affording motor interactions that are
either similar (congruent condition) or dissimilar (incon-
gruent condition) to the prime action. Participants had to
decide whether an object name shown after the target
picture corresponds with the picture or not (picture–word
matching task). We found superior accuracy for prime–
target pairs with congruent as compared to incongruent
actions across two experiments. Thus, action observation
can facilitate recognition of a manipulable object typically
involving a similar action. This action priming effect
supports the notion that action representations play a
functional role in object recognition.
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Introduction
Watching or imagining an action leads to an involvement
of the observer’s motor system, that is, activates motor
programs which are normally used to execute this partic-
ular action (for reviews see, e.g., Rizzolatti et al. 1996a;
Jeannerod 2001; Rizzolatti and Sinigalia 2007; Graf et al.
2009). Moreover, action representations and representa-
tions of manipulable objects seem to be linked. For
example, it has been shown that passively viewing, cate-
gorizing or naming manipulable objects evokes activity in
cortical areas that are involved in processing action-related
information (posterior parietal cortex, premotor cortex,
middle temporal cortex) (e.g., Martin et al. 1996; Grafton
et al. 1997; Chao et al. 1999; Chao and Martin 2000;
Gerlach et al. 2002; Hoenig et al. 2008). Motor areas were
also responsive when observers imagined interacting with
an object (Decety et al. 1994), when they named words
associated with an action (Martin et al. 1995) or when they
retrieved knowledge about possible interactions with the
object (Boronat et al. 2005). These ﬁndings suggest that
processing manipulable man-made objects activates
regions involved in processing motor- and action-related
information even when the observer does not intend to act
upon the object (see also Gre `zes and Decety 2002).
Moreover, perceiving manipulable objects automatically
activates possible actions towards the object. Several
behavioral studies demonstrate that the perception of a
manipulable object can affect the execution of subsequent
actions (Tucker and Ellis 1998, 2001, 2004; Glover et al.
2004). For example, Tucker and Ellis (2001) demonstrated
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DOI 10.1007/s00221-009-1953-8that the execution of a motor response (power or precision
grip) in a category decision task (natural versus man-made)
was strongly affected by the size of the probe object. A
power grip response was faster in response to a large
object—affording a power rather than a precision grip—
and inversely, precision grips were executed faster in
response to small objects—even though object size itself is
task-irrelevant. The perception of an object thus seems to
automatically prepare for a subsequent action. Together,
these observations suggest that action representations
contribute to the representation of manipulable (man-
made) objects such as tools or musical instruments.
In a recent study, Helbig et al. (2006) found evidence
that action representations are also functionally involved in
perception by demonstrating that action representations can
facilitate object recognition. In this study, participants had
to name brieﬂy presented objects at the basic level of
abstraction (e.g., hammer, drill). Naming accuracy was
higher when the target object was preceded by a prime
object that afforded a similar action (congruent condition),
as compared to a condition in which prime and target
object involved dissimilar actions (incongruent condition).
Prime–target pairs in congruent and incongruent conditions
were carefully matched for visual and semantic similarity
(and other possible confounding factors) to ensure that the
priming effect is not elicited by non-action-related stimulus
features. The authors argued that the observed action
priming effect is due to the pre-activation of action rep-
resentations which can prime visual object recognition.
However, action representations were not directly probed
in this study. Participants viewed pictures of manipulable
tools, but neither performed nor observed actions. In order
to further substantiate the functional involvement of action
representations in object recognition, it is therefore
important to replicate action priming effects with more
explicit action-related prime stimuli.
Hence, the present study was designed to investigate
whether observing performed actions can prime visual
object recognition. We used a picture–word matching task
that required recognizing objects at the basic level of
abstraction (e.g., Grill-Spector and Kanwisher 2005; Rosch
et al. 1976).
1
As prime stimuli, we used movie clips displaying action
sequences that were performed in interaction with an
object. These movies only showed the hands performing
the action; the objects that were involved in the actions
were erased from the movies and hence not visible. Fur-
thermore, the objects used to record the action movies were
always different from the target objects and carefully
matched for possibly confounding variables such as global
semantic and shape similarity. As outlined above, consid-
erable evidence demonstrates that observing an action
elicits motor programs typically involved in the execution
of this action (Rizzolatti et al. 1996a; Jeannerod 2001;
Rizzolatti and Sinigalia 2007; Graf et al. 2009). The
question arises whether an activation of these motor pro-
grams during action observation sufﬁces to facilitate rec-
ognition of objects affording a similar action. Such a
ﬁnding would further substantiate the proposed functional
link between the action and perception systems (Helbig
et al. 2006; Graf et al. 2009; see also Prinz 1990).
We therefore tested in two experiments whether object
recognition is superior when the previously observed action
in the prime movie is similar to the action typically
afforded by the target object (congruent condition) in
comparison to dissimilar actions (incongruent condition). It
should be noted that in the congruent condition, the actions
probed by the prime movies and the target objects were
only similar, but never identical. Hence, a mere effect of
action repetition priming can be ruled out (Kiefer 2005). If
action representations contribute to object recognition,
recognition performance is expected to be higher in the
congruent than in the incongruent condition, demonstrating
an action priming effect.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
A total of 16 volunteers (6 males) were participated for
payment. 15 participants were right-handed. The average
age was 23 years (range 20–27). All participants were
naive to the purpose of the experiments and were native
German speakers. All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and none had previously seen the stimuli.
Stimuli
We presented prime–target pairs comprised of action
movies as primes and pictures of manipulable objects as
targets. The prime stimuli consisted of eight gray-scale
movie clips, each lasting 2,000 ms (25 frames/s). The
movies showed hands performing an action in interaction
with an unseen object. Movies were recorded using the
MPI VideoLab (Kleiner et al. 2004). The actions were
ﬁlmed in front of a black background. The actor wore black
1 Picture–word matching tasks are more constrained than naming
tasks (as used in the previous study, Helbig et al. 2006), and are less
susceptible to potential priming effects related to word labels (which
may result from subjects’ attempts to imagine the names of objects
with which the actions were performed). Moreover, they are
considered to be better suited to study object recognition (see
Jolicoeur and Humphrey 1998).
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123clothing. He performed the action in interaction with real
objects in order to ensure that the dynamics of the action
were correct which is not easily achieved when merely
using pantomimes. The objects were painted black or
covered in black cloth. Thereafter, luminance-based image
thresholding was applied to each movie frame to segment
the hands which performed the action from the unwanted
‘‘background’’ parts (actor, object, background). The size
of the movie on the screen was 512 9 768 pixels (circa
18.8 9 25.3 cm) and subtended 11.9 9 17.8 at a view-
ing distance of 90 cm (a chin-rest was used to stabilize the
observers’ viewing distance). We used the following eight
actions as prime stimuli: (1) screwing with a screwdriver,
(2) pounding with a hammer, (3) ironing with an electric
iron, (4) typing on a computer keyboard, (5) rolling out
with a rolling pin, (6) sweeping with a dustpan, (7) stapling
with a stapler and (8) carrying a toolbox.
The target stimuli consisted of 56 gray-scale photographs
offamiliarman-mademanipulableobjects.Theobjectswere
inscribedintoasquareof280 9 280pixelsinordertoequate
the maximal extension. Picture size on the screen was circa
10.3 9 10.3 cm (visual angle about 6.5 at a viewing dis-
tance of about 90 cm). Prime and target stimuli were pre-
sented in the center of a 2100 monitor with a resolution of
1,024 9 768 pixels and a refresh rate of 100 Hz.
Word labels in the picture–word matching task denoted
the names of the objects at the basic level of abstraction
(Rosch et al. 1976; e.g., ‘‘corkscrew’’, ‘‘nutcracker’’,
‘‘typewriter’’, but note that we used German words as all
participants were German native speakers). They were
shown in white letters on black background in the center of
the screen. Height of the word label was about 0.9 cm,
width ranged between 2.6 and 9.7 cm (depending on word
length). Thus, the visual angles ranged from about
0.57 9 0.95 to about 0.57 9 3.81.
Procedure
Participants were instructed to ﬁxate the central ﬁxation
cross and to initiate the next trial by pressing a button.
After button press the ﬁxation cross remained visible for
1,000 ms followed by a blank black screen for 700 ms.
Then, a prime movie was shown (lasting 2,000 ms) fol-
lowed by another blank black screen for 70 ms. Subse-
quently, the target object was displayed for 80 ms. The
target object was replaced by a blank screen for 120 ms
followed by a picture showing a word label (250 ms).
Subjects were instructed to decide whether the word label
matches the previously shown target picture and to respond
as fast and as accurate as possible by pressing one of two
buttons (button assignment counterbalanced across
observers). After the response was recorded, the ﬁxation
point reappeared and the participant was able to initiate the
next trial. The experimental session started with a short
practice phase (10 trials, other stimuli than in the main
experiment). The main experiment consisted of 2 blocks; in
each block 56 stimulus pairs were presented.
Design
In the congruent condition, the eight prime movies were
combined with several (3 up to 10, on average 7) target
objects affording actions similar to the action shown in the
movie. For example, the target objects scissors, nutcracker
and pliers typically involve an action similar to the prime
action ‘‘stapling with a stapler’’ in that they all have a
typical hand movement in common: closing the hand to
compress the handles. Overall, 8 prime actions were
combined with 56 congruent target objects (examples are
shown in Fig. 1).
Importantly, target objects were never the same object
as the one which was used to record the prime action. Thus,
even if a participant guesses the (deleted) object upon
which the action was carried out, the same object never
appeared as a target stimulus. For example, when viewing
hands typing on an unseen computer keyboard it is easily
possible that the observer guesses the object (keyboard)
upon which the action is carried out. By avoiding to show
these objects as targets we could rule out that a potentially
observed ‘‘action priming’’ effect is, in fact, simply a
priming effect of the pre-activated object representation on
target recognition.
In the incongruent condition, the 56 target objects were
randomly assigned to one of the 7 dissimilar prime actions
such that each prime movie was combined with the same
number of congruent and incongruent targets. This ran-
domization was done once and was retained unchanged for
all subjects (which enables us to equate congruent and
incongruent prime–target pairs for semantic similarity; see
below).
A total of 50% of the target pictures (randomly chosen
for each observer individually) were combined with the
word label correctly denoting the object, in both the con-
gruent and the incongruent condition. On the other 50% of
the trials the remaining word labels were randomly
assigned to the target objects such that they did not match
the target. The presentation order of prime–target stimulus
pairs was randomized.
Norming studies
In two norming studies, ratings were obtained with regard
to action similarity and semantic similarity in order to (1)
ensure that in the congruent condition the similarity
between prime action and the action participants typically
associate with the target object is indeed signiﬁcantly
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123higher than in the incongruent condition and (2) to ensure
that semantic similarity does not differ across congruent
and incongruent conditions (to rule out a potential con-
found by global semantic similarity).
In the ﬁrst norming experiment (action similarity), a
prime movie and a target object were sequentially pre-
sented in every trial (same pairing and same procedure as
in Experiment 1, see below). Prime–target pairs were
presented in randomized order. Subjects (n = 11) had to
judge the similarity between observed prime action and the
action they typically associate with the target object on a
scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates very low and 7 very
high similarity. A two-tailed two-sample t test revealed that
action similarity was signiﬁcantly higher for congruent as
opposed to incongruent prime–target pairs (incong. 2.41,
cong. 6.00, P\0.001) indicating that the experimental
manipulation was effective (see Fig. 2).
In the second norming study (semantic similarity), a
photograph of the object, which has been used to record the
prime action, was presented before the congruent and
incongruent target objects (same procedure as in the ﬁrst
norming study). Participants (n = 12) had to indicate the
semantic similarity between the object used in the action
movie and the target object (on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1
indicating very low similarity, 7 very high similarity). A
two-tailed two-sample t test did not reveal signiﬁcant
differences of semantic similarity (incong. 4.58, cong.
4.64, P[0.6) between prime–target stimulus pairs from
incongruent and congruent conditions (see Fig. 2). This
result renders it unlikely that a potential priming effect in
the main experiments (1 and 2) is due to differences in
global semantic similarity.
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Fig. 1 Examples for prime–target pairs associated with congruent
and incongruent typical actions. Stimuli are organized into action
groups. Each group consists of a prime stimulus (short video clip
showing hands performing an action) paired with several target
objects that involve an action similar to the one displayed in the prime
video clip (congruent action) and an identical number of objects that
involve dissimilar actions (incongruent action). For example, the
action displayed in the prime movie of action group 1, ‘‘rolling out
with a rolling pin’’, involves similar movements as the typical actions
associated with the target objects of the congruent condition which is
pushing a lawn mower, a wheelbarrow or a walker
S
i
m
i
l
a
r
i
t
y
n=11
cong. incong.
Action Similarity
cong. incong.
Semantic Similarity
low
high
n=12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Fig. 2 Results of the norming studies. Left panel action similarity
rating on a scale from 1 to 7 were 1 indicates low and 7 high
similarity. Right panel rating of the semantic similarity between the
object used to record the prime movie and the target object (on a scale
from 1 to 7). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean
across observers
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The analysis was restricted to trials on which picture—
word label pairing was correct—as processes underlying
performance in incorrect picture–word trials are less con-
strained than in correct trials. Analysis of reaction time
data was additionally restricted to trials on which the par-
ticipants responded correctly to the task.
Matching accuracy was higher in the congruent than in
the incongruent condition (cong.: mean acc. = 94.3%, in-
cong.: mean acc. = 89.6%). A one-tailed paired-sample t
test revealed a signiﬁcant effect of action congruency
[t(15) = 2,833, P\0.01]. Reaction times did not differ
signiﬁcantly across conditions [cong.: mean RT = 416 ms,
incong.: mean RT = 424, t(15) =- 0,916, P[0.18] (see
Fig. 3 upper panels).
In agreement with our prediction we found an action
priming effect on matching accuracy—although we con-
trolled for semantic similarity as a potential confounding
factor. We did not observe an effect on reaction times.
Importantly, reaction times are not faster in the incongruent
condition and thus, the observed priming effect on accu-
racy does not merely reﬂect a speed-accuracy trade-off.
Accuracy in the picture–word matching task was on
average at about 90%, and thus relatively high. Potentially,
when the perceptual system is more taxed by masking the
target object, action priming effects may become stronger
and possibly evident also in the reaction times.
Experiment 2
Our aim in Experiment 2 was twofold. First, we wanted to
replicate the action priming effect, and second, we assessed
whether the action priming effect can be demonstrated also
for reaction times when object naming is more demanding.
For this reason we introduced a mask (42 ms) immediately
after the target object in order to deteriorate viewing con-
ditions and impose higher difﬁculty on the task through
backward masking. We expected to ﬁnd an action priming
effect both for recognition accuracy and for naming
latencies.
Method
A total of 16 volunteers (5 males) were participated in
Experiment 2. They all were right-handed and the average
age was 24 years (range 19–32). Procedure, task and
design were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the
target object was followed by a randomly selected mask
presented for 40 ms in order to reduce prime visibility.
Four masks were created by pasting image fragments of
several target objects into a patchwork-like picture, and a
mask was randomly selected in each trial.
Results
Matching accuracy was again higher in the congruent than
in the incongruent condition (cong.: mean acc. = 93.9%,
incong.: mean acc. = 87.3%). A one-tailed paired-sample t
test revealed a signiﬁcant effect of action congruency
[t(15) = 3,252, P\0.002]. Again, reaction times did not
differ signiﬁcantly across conditions [cong.: mean
RT = 496 ms, incong.: mean RT = 506, t(15) =- 0,552,
P[0.29] (see Fig. 3 lower panels). Again, there are no
signs for a speed–accuracy trade-off.
The results of Experiment 1 were replicated and thus, it
was conﬁrmed that observing an action movie (prime)
exerts a facilitatory effect on the recognition of a
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Fig. 3 Performance in the picture-word matching task for prime–
target pairs with congruent and incongruent actions. Left panels
accuracy in percent correct responses. Right panels reaction times.
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean across observers.
Experiment 1 without masking of the target object. Experiment 2 with
backward masking of the target object
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123subsequently presented manipulable object typically
involving a similar action. This indicates that action
knowledge contributes to object recognition. Numerically,
the action priming effect on error rate was somewhat larger
than in Experiment 1 suggesting that the increased difﬁ-
culty to identify the target object (as indicated by the
increased average reaction times in Experiment 2 as
opposed to Experiment 1) enhanced the inﬂuence of the
prime movies. However, action priming effects did not
generalize to reaction times. Possibly, the action priming as
realized in the present experiments only facilitates accu-
racy, but not speed of object recognition. Alternatively,
action priming effects may be found when the viewing
conditions for the target object are further impaired.
General discussion
In two experiments, we found that observing an action
sequence can prime the recognition of a subsequently
presented manipulable object that typically involves a
similar action. This ﬁnding indicates that action represen-
tations constitute part of the representation of manipulable
man-made objects such as tools and musical instruments
and play a functional role in object processing.
Although this action priming on picture-matching
accuracy was signiﬁcant in the by-subject analysis, it was
not reliable in by-item analyses suggesting that only a
limited amount of items contributed to the effect. Yet, a
closer inspection of the results of the item analyses
revealed that accuracy was at ceiling for about half of the
target objects. As a consequence, the prime movie could
not modulate object recognition performance for these
items which is the most likely reason for the non-signiﬁ-
cance of the action priming effect in the item analyses.
It should be noted that in the action movies used as
primes in our experiment the objects that were acted upon
were erased and never the same as the target objects.
Instead, target objects in the congruent condition were
always different objects that only involve similar typical
actions. Hence, we can rule out that the observed priming
effect was simply due to a repetition of the object infor-
mation inherent in prime and target stimuli. Furthermore,
we carefully matched overall semantic similarity between
objects used in the action movies and the target objects for
the congruent and incongruent conditions so that semantic
priming effects can also be excluded. Thus, even if par-
ticipants had correctly guessed the object, which was
involved in performing the prime action, non-action-related
object knowledge could not contribute to the presently
observed priming effects. Finally, our experimental design
also rules out that the priming effect depends on the
identity of action words related to the prime movie and the
target objects because the actions demonstrated in the
prime movies and the actions associated with the target
objects were always different, but only showed a high
action similarity based on movement similarity in the
congruent condition (e.g., stapling with a stapler and cut-
ting with a scissors). As global semantic similarity was
matched, the target action even in the congruent conditions
could not be more accurately predicted from the prime
action than in the incongruent condition. Hence, we can
safely conclude that the present action priming effect on
object recognition is based on the similarity of the observed
action and the action affordance of the target object.
Our results are in good agreement with the view that
objects are represented in a distributed fashion in sensory
and motor areas that code different types of knowledge
about an object (e.g., how it looks like, how it moves, how
to interact with it) (e.g., Martin et al. 1995, 2000; Kiefer
2001; Kiefer and Spitzer 2001; Weisberg et al. 2007;
Hoenig et al. 2008). According to this view, an object is
represented by a pattern of activation across the multiple
subsystems where activity is relatively more pronounced in
areas processing attributes more relevant to the object.
Action-related information is particularly important for
representing manipulable objects such as tools (e.g.,
Warrington and Shallice 1984; Warrington and McCarthy
1987; Farah and McClelland 1991; Sacchett and Humph-
reys 1992). Therefore, action knowledge may exert a
facilitatory effect on recognition of manipulable objects
(e.g., Chao and Martin 2000; Helbig et al. 2006).
It has been discussed whether action representation
merely play an epiphenomenal role in the representation of
manipulable objects, which are evoked by post-conceptual
imagery or associative processes (Machery 2007; but see
Kiefer et al. 2007; Kiefer et al. 2008). The presently
obtained action priming effects rule out this possibility
because they demonstrate the functional involvement of
action representations during the course of object recog-
nition: Imagery or associative processes can only be
evoked after the concept is accessed and the object is fully
recognized. As action representations already inﬂuence the
object recognition process, they must be an integral part of
the object representation rather being evoked at later pro-
cessing stages.
How could the observed action priming effect be func-
tionally mediated? Action observation and the execution of
an action activate similar neural substrates as demonstrated
by a number of neuroimaging (e.g., Rizzolatti et al. 1996b;
Decety et al. 1997; Gre `zes et al. 1998; Handy et al. 2003)
and neurophysiological studies (e.g., Fadiga et al. 1995;
Hari et al. 1998; Cochin et al. 1999). This suggests that the
perception of an action sequence activates the corre-
sponding motor representation (e.g., Rizzolatti et al.
1996a). It therefore seems likely that the observed priming
256 Exp Brain Res (2010) 200:251–258
123effect is caused by the pre-activation of motor representa-
tions triggered by observing the prime action. Likewise,
representations of manipulable objects strongly involve
and interact with the motor system (Tucker and Ellis 1998,
2001; Glover et al. 2004; Craighero et al. 2008). Thus, it
seems that in the present study and in a previous experi-
ment (Helbig et al. 2006) action representations (matching
the motor affordance of the target object) were activated by
means of different prime stimuli (action movies vs. pictures
of manipulable objects) and facilitate object recognition
performance. However, it remains an open question which
stage of the object recognition process is inﬂuenced by
action representations. Action representations may already
contribute to perceptual encoding, for instance by facili-
tating the activation of the appropriate structural descrip-
tions (Humphreys et al. 1988). Alternatively, action
representations could help to access the correct object
concept through activating action-related conceptual fea-
tures. This issue has to be addressed in future studies, e.g.,
by exploiting the high temporal resolution of event-related
potential recordings.
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that
observing an action can facilitate the recognition of
manipulable man-made objects that typically involve a
similar action. This result indicates that action representa-
tions play a functional role in visual object recognition.
The present study therefore further supports the notion of a
functional interaction between the brain systems for object
recognition and object-directed action.
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